ABSTRACT With regard to the privacy of client-server communication systems, most research works have concentrated on authentication to guarantee security. Among the investigated schemes, two-factor password authentication has been a major focus and has undergone considerable development. Two-factor password authentication is a process in which both a password and a physical object are used for authentication to achieve a higher level of security. However, these methods are still subject to some security vulnerabilities, such as malicious card reader attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and a lack of perfect forward secrecy. Moreover, although there are many evaluation criteria, there still lacks a set of universal criteria. To address these issues, a two-factor password authentication scheme is proposed in the context of practical application environment in this paper, such as side-channel attacks. Moreover, a card reader verification step is added to the authentication scheme to counteract malicious card reader attacks. In addition, the proposed scheme can resist various known attacks, including replay attacks, lost or stolen smart card attacks, and man-inthe-middle attacks. We present a detailed security analysis and comparative evaluation, and we prove the security of our scheme with Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic. Compared with previous schemes, the main advantages of the proposed scheme are its low computational cost, guaranteed security, and better adaptability to actual client-server communication environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
with the rapid development of the Internet and the concomitant growth in network applications, client-server communication schemes have been widely applied in e-commerce, smart homes, cloud services, online payment systems, telecare medical information systems (TMISs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and so on. Thus, data security and authentication is an attractive avenue of research that is intended to protect sensitive information exchanged in such client-server communication systems from malicious adversaries [1] - [4] .
The first password authentication scheme in which authentication between a user and a server was achieved by means of a password was proposed by Lamport [5] . Verification tables were used to record the identity ID and password PW of each registered user in this scheme. However, the existence of such authentication tables leads to the risk that they may be stolen or that the server may be untrusted. Moreover, other security vulnerabilities have been found in this scheme, such as dictionary attacks and password guessing attacks. In 1991, an effective remedy was proposed by Chang and Wu [6] in the form of a remote password authentication scheme using a smart card, which is a form of two-factor authentication [6] . However, a new problem emerged: for convenience, most users tend to use the same password to login to different servers. In this situation, it is easy for a domino effect to arise. In other words, if one server is compromised, other servers can also be compromised. Similarly, the introduction of a smart card into the password authentication scheme is another potential security vulnerability because of the possibility of internal data leakages or loss of the smart card. With further technological developments, researchers are beginning to utilize ''biometric characteristics'' as another major factor in authentication schemes, when combined with passwords and smart cards, enable the development of three-factor authentication schemes that can further enhanced security. Nevertheless, the objective of this research is to focus primarily on a two-factor authentication scheme based on a password and a smart card. Therefore, three-factor authentication schemes are outside the scope of this research.
A. RELATED WORK
In the majority of prior research works on two-factor password authentication schemes, the security of these schemes has depended primarily on the adoption of encryption technologies, such as hash functions, elliptic curve cryptography, and the RSA and ElGamal cryptosystems [7] - [17] . In 2014, Qu and Tan [12] presented a two-factor authentication scheme with a key agreement phase based on elliptic curve cryptography. It was claimed that this scheme can resist lost smart card attacks, offline password guessing attacks, forgery attacks, and so on. Huang et al. [13] proposed an efficient authentication scheme that can resist offline password guessing attacks and forgery attacks. In 2016, Maitra et al. [14] reported that the existing schemes could not resist forgery attacks. A two-factor authentication scheme based on a one-way hash function and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem was presented by Maitra et al. [14] . Based on the ElGamal cryptosystem, Lee et al. [15] proposed a two-factor password authentication scheme. However, Lee et al.'s scheme still cannot resist forgery attacks and offline password guessing attacks [16] . A better twofactor authentication scheme based on ElGamal was proposed by Maitra et al. [16] , who used the ProVerif online testing software to prove the effectiveness of its privacy protection for information in client-server systems. Recently, Wang and Wang [17] presented a two-factor authentication scheme with security that goes beyond conventional bound and eliminates the conflict between security and usability.
The development history of partially smart-card-based password authentication schemes is illustrated in Table 1 . Our literature review found that the scheme reported by Wang and Wang [17] is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and malicious card reader attacks, and it cannot provide perfect forward secrecy. Moreover, the new list of 12 evaluation criteria presented by these authors contains redundancies.
B. PRELIMINARIES
Note that the security of the previous partially smart-cardbased authentication schemes listed in Table 1 generally reduces to certain mathematical problems. Therefore, some of the relevant mathematical concepts and mathematically difficult problems are briefly introduced in the following.
• One-way Hash Function [31] : A hash function is not reversible; in other words, a hash function is meant to be unidirectional. With a good cryptographic hash function, finding two intelligible strings that hash to the same value is extremely difficult in practice. More formally, if we provide a mapping y of a function H , it is difficult to find an x that satisfies H (x) = y. Similarly, if we provide x and H (x), it is extremely difficult to find another message x = x that satisfies H (x ) = H (x).
• Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) based on an Elliptic Curve [32] : It is difficult to find an [a · b]P ∈ E(F q ) from a given A, B and P such that A = [a]P and B = [b]P, where A, B, P ∈ E(F q ) and a, b ∈ Z * p .
• Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [33] : Let an elliptic curve E be defined over the finite field F q . Let the point P ∈ E(F q ) be a base point of the elliptic curve and its order be n. If Q belongs to P, generating a cyclic group (P), then we wish to find a k such that the equation Q = [k]P holds, where k is a positive integer in the range of [0, n − 1]. The difficulty of solving for k = log p Q is the difficulty of the ECDLP.
To simplify the description of our authentication scheme, we use the following notations in this paper: Generally, for a password authentication scheme, researchers will make some assumptions about the ability of an attacker to analyze the security of their scheme. In traditional password authentication schemes, the adversary A is allowed full control over the communication channel between a user and the server. In other words, the adversary has the ability to perform arbitrary operations on information transmitted through public channels. Based on this assumption, researchers define a security model that describes the capabilities of adversary A for own password authentication scheme. Furthermore, with the continuous development of technology, the adversary may gain a more powerful ability to obtain the desired information through high-tech means, thereby becoming a greater potential threat to the user's privacy in real operating environments. For instance, the secret parameters stored on a smart card can be obtained by utilizing certain types of power analysis attacks, side channel attacks and so on. Even worse, if the card reader is controlled by an attacker, users' password may be stolen when they input them during registration or login; such an attack is called a ''malicious card reader attack''.
In recent studies, although some researchers have considered the problem of malicious card readers, their schemes have not included measures to resist such attacks. For instance, the ability of an adversary to steal a password through VOLUME 6, 2018 a malicious card reader attack is assumed in [17] and [34] . However, the proposed schemes are still vulnerable to malicious card reader attacks. To provide a better understanding of different adversary models, some examples are shown in Table 2 . As shown, the capabilities of adversaries have become increasingly strong over time. Therefore, the proposed scheme will be based on the adversary model of Wang et al. [17] and combine with the practical application environment to allow the abilities of the adversary.
D. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
When designing password authentication schemes, researchers seek schemes that can simultaneously offer security and practicability. Currently, the question of how to achieve true two-factor security has become a hot topic in password authentication based on smart cards. A feasible scheme should be able to resist all types of attacks and eliminate negative effects under any conditions, such as stolen smart card attacks, offline password guessing attacks, insider attacks and impersonation attacks. To this end, numerous approaches for two-factor password authentication have been proposed in recent years.
However, we found that most related schemes have not considered the case of malicious card reader attacks. In a malicious card reader attack, an attacker can obtain the legitimate ID and valid password PW of a user by attacking the card reader. This paper describes a new two-factor password authentication scheme with efficient card reader verification. We propose a two-factor password authentication scheme based on an elliptic curve cryptosystem with a card reader verification step that achieves security against malicious card reader attacks.
Compared with previous works, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We review and analyze the two-factor password authentication scheme proposed by Wang et al. 2) We propose an efficient and secure two-factor password authentication scheme with card reader (terminal) verification.
3) A formal security proof based on Burrows-AbadiNeedham(BAN) logic and conventional analysis is presented that guarantees the security of the proposed scheme. 4) A comparative evaluation demonstrates the superiority of the proposed scheme over related schemes.
E. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Sections II and III, we review and analyze Wang et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme is presented in Section IV, and its security analysis and security proof are presented in Sections V and VI, respectively. A performance evaluation of the proposed scheme in comparison with previously proposed schemes is reported in Section VII. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. REVIEW OF WANG et al.'s SCHEME
In 2016, Wang et al. proposed a two-factor authentication scheme with security beyond the conventional bound. They also presented an evaluation framework consisting of 12 evaluation criteria. It was stated that with this scheme, a protocol could be defined on either a finite group or an elliptic curve group. In this section, we will briefly introduce the four phases of this scheme, namely, the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and password change phase, and analyze the security of each phase.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
Let G =< g > be a finite cyclic group with an l-bit prime number of order q. It is assumed that G ∈ Z * p . The hash functions [31] are H i (·) : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l i , where i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Moreover, a medium integer n 0 is defined, where 2 4 ≤ n 0 ≤ 2 8 . This value is used to determine the ability of a given (ID, PW ) pair to resist offline password guessing attacks. The set private key of the server is x, and its corresponding public key is y = g x modp, which is stored in each smart card given to users. The steps of the registration phase are as follows:
1) The user U i chooses an identity ID i and a password PW i and generates a random string b.
3) The server S receives the registration information at time T . First, S chooses a random number a i and com-
. Then, S checks whether U i is a newly registered user; if so, S creates a new entry in which to store the information {ID i , T reg , a i , Honey_List}. Otherwise, S updates all the users' information except for their identity ID i . Furthermore, the server computes
Next, U i inputs the random string b into the SC twice to confirm its correctness.
Note that the random string b is discarded after step 2.
B. LOGIN PHASE
The steps of the login phase are as follows:
1) The user U i inserts the smart card SC into the card reader and inputs their ID i and PW i . 
2) The smart card SC computes
A * i = H 0 ((H 0 (ID * i ⊕ H 0 (b PW * i ))modnC 1 = g u modp, Y 1 = y u modp, k = H 0 (x ID i T reg ) = N i ⊕ H 0 (b PW * i ), a i = (A i ⊕ a i ) ⊕ A i , CID i = ID * i ⊕H 0 (C 1 Y 1 ), CAK i = (a i k)⊕H 0 (Y 1 C 1 ), and M i = H 0 (Y 1 k CID i CAK i ). 4) U i {C 1 ,CID i ,CAK i ,M i } − −−−−−−−−− −→ S.
C. VERIFICATION PHASE
The steps of the verification phase are as follows:
1) The server S computes Y 1 = (C 1 ) x modp using its private key x. Then, it obtains
If this ID i is equal to the ID i stored in the server, then S proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, the session is terminated. 2) The server S computes k = H 0 (x ID i T reg ) and
3) The server S successfully obtains a k = CAK i ⊕ H 0 (Y 1 ⊕ C 1 ) and checks to ensure a i ? = a i . When the equality is satisfied, the login request information A i is correct; otherwise, S refuses the login request. Furthermore, it checks to ensure that k ? = k. When both the judgment equations mentioned above are true, S proceeds to the next step. If the results are that a i = a i and but k = k, then S concludes that there is an overwhelming probability that SC has been compromised. Hence, S either inserts k into Honey_List (when fewer than m 0 items exist in Honey_List) or suspends the use of the smart card until U i registers (when more than m 0 items exist in Honey_List). 4) The server S randomly generates a number v and computes a temporary key
When the user U i receives the reply message from the server S, the smart card SC computes K u = (C 2 ) u modp and
and checks whether C * 3 ? = C 3 . This equivalent authentication confirms the legitimacy of the server S. Then, U i computes
= C 4 is checked. If the equality holds, then the user U i is considered authenticated with server S and the login request is accepted. 9) The secret key for the session is
D. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
This phase avoids the hassle of connecting to the remote server for local operations. Table 3 .
III. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF WANG et al.'s SCHEME A. EVALUATION CRITERIA
In many previous proposals, the authors have highlighted the vulnerabilities of previous schemes and then proposed their own improved schemes, which they claim offer higher security. In addition, various evaluation criteria have been proposed by researchers. For instance Yanget al. [35] , Wang et al. [37] , and Madhusudhan and Mittal [38] have investigated and analyzed some of the standard criteria. However, Wang and Wang [17] noted that some previously proposed criteria suffer from redundancies or conflicts. Hence, Wang et al. presented a new list of 12 criteria summarized VOLUME 6, 2018 from previous evaluation studies and their own cryptanalysis experiences.
Wang et al.'s scheme ensures security against even the most capable adversary. They proved that their scheme simultaneously satisfies two objectives: it not only offers both security and practicability but also provides security guarantees beyond the traditional optimal security constraints. However, previous studies have shown that adversary can effectively extract the sensitive data by launching sidechannel attacks. Thus, we have found that this scheme cannot resist user impersonation attack, malicious card reader attacks. On the other hand, according to the evaluation criterion C8 of Wang et al.'s scheme, we found that some schemes adopted random numbers or sequence methods, and some other schemes adopted time stamp method. Therefore, defining a more reasonable and comprehensive set of evaluation criteria would be beneficial for measuring the security of a smart-card-based password authentication scheme. To this end, we propose a list of 11 evaluation criteria, as shown in Table 4 .
B. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
In the registration phase, if an adversary extracts ID i by launching side-channel attacks. Then in near future, an adversary A can impersonate user U i as explained in the following: in the registration phase, the registration request information {ID i , H 0 (b PW A i )}, where PW A i is chosen by the adversary A as his/her own password. Then, the security parameter in the smart card will be changed to
However, in the login phase, the user U i inputs ID * i , PW * i , but A * i and A A i are not equal, the session is terminated. Thus, it causes the user to fail to login successfully.
C. MALICIOUS CARD READER ATTACK
The legitimacy of the card reader is not verified when the user U i inserts his/her smart card SC into a card reader during the verification phase of Wang et al.'s scheme; thus, a compromised card reader can easily obtain the user's ID i and PW i . Therefore, this scheme cannot resist malicious card reader attacks.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
From the above comprehensive analysis, we conclude that some previous schemes have no resistance against certain known attacks. Moreover, the security evaluation criteria for those schemes are not ideal. To address these problems, we propose a more secure and efficient two-factor smartcard-based password authentication scheme in this section. This scheme also consists of four phases: registration phase, login phase, verification phase, and password change phase. In addition, we present a brief analysis of the security evaluation criteria and the adversary capabilities for the proposed password authentication scheme.
Several parameters are initialized before the authentication operation. An elliptic curve E of order n is defined over a finite field F p . We denote this by E/F p or E(F p ), where p is a prime number. The server S chooses a private key s ∈ R Z * n and calculates the corresponding public key PK = [s]P. The card reader CR chooses a private key s r ; thus, the corresponding public key is sk r = [s r ]P. The hash function is denoted by
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
The steps of the registration phase are as follows:
1) The user U i chooses an ID i and PW i , randomly chooses a number r i , and computes PID i = H 1 (ID i PW i r i ) and HID i = H 1 (ID i R i ), where R i is an registered random number assigned by the server S for an registered user, which is fixed for the user. Then, U i sends PID i and HID i to the server S via a secure channel, and HID i is stored on S.
2) The server S randomly chooses a number n i after receiving PID i and HID i . Then, S computes
The server S sends a smart card SC with parameters AID i , n, and PWN i to the user U i . Notably, PID i must be destroyed. The random number r i is stored when the user U i receives the smart card SC. Finally, the secret parameters AID i , n, PWN i , and r i are stored on the smart card.
B. LOGIN PHASE
The steps of the login phase are as follows: = MID i . If the equality holds, then the server S will move to the next step. Otherwise, the session is terminated.
3) The server S randomly chooses a number b i and computes the authentication succeeds. Otherwise, the authentication fails, and the session is terminated.
D. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
The steps of the password change phase are as follows:
1) The user U i inserts his/her smart card SC into the card reader CR and inputs ID i . Then, the server S randomly generates a number k i and computes Table 5 .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
We analyze the security of the proposed scheme in this section by presenting detailed proofs for 12 types of attacks under the assumptions given at the beginning of Section I−C.
A. OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK a) An adversary A steals the information AID i , PWN i , r i and n i from a smart card by some means.
• For AID i = PID i ⊕ H 1 (s HID i ), where
PW i r i ), the adversary cannot successfully guess ID i and PW i in polynomial time to determine PID i . Additionally, s is the private key of the server S; thus, the adversary cannot acquire s. Therefore, the adversary cannot guess the necessary information.
• For PWN i = H 1 (AID i BID i n i ), although the adversary A can obtain n i = n i ⊕ AID i from n i and AID i , the above analysis shows that A cannot successfully guess ID i and PW i in polynomial time to determine AID i . Therefore, the adversary A cannot guess the necessary information. b) An adversary A steals the login request information A i , CID i , MID i and T u 1 by some means.
• For A i = [a i ]P, the adversary A cannot guess the random number a i because of the difficulty of the ECDLP.
• 
D. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
Even if an adversary A were to acquire some useful information, A cannot cheat both the user and the server at the same time because the random numbers a i and b i are generated by the user and the server, respectively. Moreover, T s 2 and T u 2 are timestamps for the user and server, respectively. Therefore, the session information B i , VID i , and T s 2 and the session information WID i and T u 2 cannot be forged simultaneously. It follows that the adversary fails and, thus, our scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attacks. • The adversary A guesses an (ID A , PW A ) pair and also randomly chooses a number r A for the user, another random number a A ∈ R Z * p , and s A ∈ R Z * p as the server's private key.
• The adversary A computes
LA A x LA A y T A ) and sends A A , CID A , MID A , and T A to the server S.
• After the server S receives A A , CID A , MID A , and T A , it checks whether T s 1 = T A and T s 1 −T A ≤ T are satisfied. When true, the server S computes
). Furthermore, the server S checks whether HID * A is equal to the HID i stored in its database. Note that HID * A is considered legitimate if and only if A chooses the correct identity ID A . However, the identity of the user U i cannot be computed or guessed, as was proven in the above security analysis concering offline password guessing attacks. Furthermore, it is necessary for the adversary A to successfully guess LA A , which is equivalent to guessing a A = a i . This would enable the server to successfully calculate above analysis, because this is an ECDLP, the adversary A cannot successfully create the replay information.
F. MALICIOUS CARD READER ATTACK
In the login and password change phases, we add a card reader authentication step to prevent an impersonated card reader or terminal from stealing a user's identity ID i and password PW i . When user U i inserts his/her smart card into a card reader or terminal, the terminal must verify its legitimacy. However, if this step fails to prevent the malicious card reader from stealing the user's information. In other words, even if an adversary gets the identity ID i and password PW i , the adversary will fail to attack due to the existence of registered random numbers R i . Thus, our scheme can resist malicious card reader attacks.
G. INSIDER ATTACK
In practice, most users will utilize the same ID i and password PW i to register on different servers. This behavior can lead to a risk of insider attacks on the user's accounts. However, because of the one-way hash function, an inside attack on the server still cannot yield the user's ID i and password PW i .
H. USER ANONYMITY
As part of the registration information, the identity ID i of U i is sent to S in the form HID i = H 1 (ID i R i ) and PID i = H 1 (ID i PW i r i ) rather than being sent directly. Additionally, the session key and ID i are not disclosed during login and replay information because of the one-way hash function. Therefore, this scheme preserves user anonymity.
I. LOST SMART CARD ATTACK
If a smart card SC is stolen by an adversary A from user U i or U i loses her/his smart card SC, then we assume the information AID i , n, PWN i and r i can be obtained from the smart card by the adversary A. However, for AID i = PID i ⊕ H 1 (s HID i ) and PWN i = H 1 (AID i BID i n i ), the ID i and PW i of the user cannot be acquired via an offline guessing attack, as proven in Section V. (1) . Therefore, our scheme can resist lost smart card attacks. = VID i in step 4 of the verification phase. Thus, our proposed password scheme provides mutual authentication.
K. FORGERY ATTACK
In our proposed scheme, an adversary A needs to forge the login request information A i , CID i , MID i and T u 1 to perform a forgery attack. However, the adversary cannot obtain the server's private key s. Therefore, it is difficult for the adversary to compute LA i = [s]P. Furthermore, the login information and mutual information are protected by the ECDLP. Hence, our proposed scheme resists forgery attacks.
L. PARALLEL SESSION ATTACK
If an adversary A attempts to forge the login request information A i , CID i , MID i and T u 1 or the response information B i , VID i and T s 2 by eavesdropping in order to execute a parallel session attack, this attempt will be detected by the server S because of the time stamp check in the verification phase. Hence, our proposed scheme can resist parallel session attacks.
VI. SECURITY PROOF FOR THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed scheme using BAN logic [39] , [40] . We prove that the proposed scheme establishes a session key between the user U i and the server S. Let X and Y be symbols for statements, P and Q be symbols for principles, and K be a symbol representing some secret information in BAN logic. Following is a brief description of the BAN logic notation needed to analyze the proposed scheme:
• P| ≡ X : P believes X.
• P X : P sees X.
• P| ∼ X : P once said X.
• P| ⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over X.
• #(X ): The formula X is fresh.
• P K ← → Q: P and Q may use the shared key K.
• (X ) K : The hashed value of X with K as the key.
• (X , Y ) K : The hashed value of X and Y with K as the key.
• X Y : X combined with the formula Y.
• SK i = VID i : The session key established between the user U i and the server S. The BAN logical postulates used in this paper are given below.
(1) The message-meaning rule: 
The proposed scheme satisfies the following goals:
An idealized message exchange is described as follows:
The assumptions of the scheme are as follows:
It is clear from Message 1 that
From Eq. (1), A 1 and the message-meaning rule, it is clear that
From A 2 and the freshness-conjuncatenation rule, it is clear that
From Eqs. (2) and (3) and the nonce-verification rule, it is clear that
From Eq. (4) and the belief rule, it is clear that
i.e., Goal 2 : (5), A 3 and the jurisdiction rule, it is clear that
It is clear from Message 2 that
From Eq. (7), A 4 and the message-meaning rule, it is clear that
From A 5 and the freshness-conjuncatenation rule, it is clear that
From Eqs. (8) and (9) and the nonce-verification rule, it is clear that
From Eq. (10) and the belief rule, it is clear that
From Eq. (11), A 6 and the jurisdiction rule, it is clear that
In conclusion, we have proven that the proposed scheme meets all the goals. Thus, the security proof for this scheme has been demonstrated.
VII. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSES OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Normally, a password authentication scheme is analyzed from two main perspectives: performance and functionality. Therefore, in this section, we summarize the computational costs and security properties of our proposed scheme and present comparisons with previous schemes.
A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON IN TERMS OF COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
To analyze and compare the computational complexity of our proposed scheme more accurately, we use the following notations to denote the times of various operations in the scheme:
T h : The time required for the hash operation; T pm : The time required for the point multiplication operation;
T m : The time required for the multiplication operation; T e : The time required for the modular exponentiation operation;
T s : The time required for the symmetric key encryption/ decryption operation.
According to the computational cost analyses presented in [14] , [16] , [28] , [29] , [31] , and [41] , the computational costs of these operations satisfy the following relations: T e T m > T h ≈ T s > T pm . To achieve a more comprehensive analysis and comparison of the computational costs of various schemes, we separately consider the registration, login, and verification phases of each password authentication scheme. The computational costs of our proposed scheme and of previous schemes are shown in Table 6 .
The computational costs of the three analyzed phases of our proposed scheme are 5T h , 6T h + 5T pm and 6T h + 3T pm , respectively. By contrast, the computational costs of the three corresponding phases of Wang et al.'s scheme are 4T h + T e , 6T h + 3T e and 9T h + 4T e , respectively. Based on these results, we can safely conclude that the computational costs of our scheme are lower than those of Wang et al.'s scheme. In Qu et al.'s scheme, the computational costs of the three corresponding phases are 3T h , 5T h + 3T pm and 8T h + 6T pm , respectively. Although our computational costs in the registration and login phases are slightly greater than those of Qu et al.'s scheme, our computational cost in the verification phase is lower. Notably, the computational cost of the verification phase is the dominant cost for password authentication. Therefore, our scheme is superior to these previous schemes in terms of computational cost, as shown in Table 6 . 
B. EFFICIENCY COMPARISON BASED ON SECURITY PROPERTIES
To simplify the presentation of this comparison, we define the following notations: S1: Resistance against offline password guessing attacks; S2: Resistance against replay attacks; S3: Perfect forward secrecy; S4: Resistance against man-in-the-middle attacks; S5: Resistance against impersonation attacks; S6: Resistance against malicious card reader attacks; S7: Resistance against lost smart card attacks; S8: Resistance against insider attacks; S9: User anonymity; S10: Mutual authentication; S11: Resistance against forgery attacks; and S12: Resistance against parallel session attacks. The comparison of our proposed scheme with previous schemes is summarized in Table 7 . As shown, our proposed scheme provides a more comprehensive security guarantee than any of the other tested schemes. In particular, only our proposed scheme can resist malicious card reader attacks. Thus, our proposed scheme achieves higher security and practicality than do other schemes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we take the practical application environment of the scheme as the analysis background. In this case, we analyzed the security of Wang et al.'s scheme. Therefore, we proposed an efficient and secure two-factor authentication scheme that can withstand various known attacks, including offline password guessing attacks, malicious card reader attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks, among others. Moreover, this scheme offers additional important security properties, such as user anonymity, mutual authentication, and perfect forward secrecy. Specifically, the security of our scheme is based on the ECDLP and a one-way hash function. We provided both a security analysis and a security proof of the proposed scheme. Through a comprehensive security analysis and performance evaluation, we demonstrated that our proposed scheme is more secure and more efficient than most existing authentication schemes in the literature. In future work, we will further improve the practical application efficiency of our two-factor password authentication scheme. XIAONAN LUO is currently a Professor with the School of Computer Science and Information Security, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin, China. His current research interests include computer vision, image processing, and computer graphics and CAD. VOLUME 6, 2018 
